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THE "FOUR CORNERS" REQUIREMENT:
A CONSTITUTIONAL PREREQUISITE
TO SEARCH WARRANT VALIDITY
PATRICK C. MCGINLEY*

I. Introduction
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-

sons or things to be seized.'
The fourth amendment clearly requires as conditions precedent to
search warrant issuance that "probable cause" be established and that
such probable cause be "supported by Oath or affirmation." The amendment does not, however, further specify how this mandate should be carried out by an issuing authority. Thus, in a number of cases it has been held
that the fourth amendment does not require that either the "Oath or
affirmation," 2 or the facts which underlie a finding of probable cause,3 to be found with the "four corners" of a warrant affidavit or
to be otherwise recorded prior to warrant issuance. Although through rule4
or statute5 some states and the federal government have adopted a "four
*A.B., Dickinson College; J.D., Duke University. Assistant Professor of Law, West
Virginia University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the West
Virginia University Foundation.- Ed.
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 See, e.g., Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1937); State v. Walcott, 72 Wash.
2d 959, 435 P.2d 994, (1967) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 890 (1968).
3 See, e.g., Campbell v. Minnesota, 487 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel.
Gaugler v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973); Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1971);
Sherrick v. Eyman, 389 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968); Miller v. Sigler, 353
F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 980 (1966); United States ex rel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N. Y.) 1970, aff'd, 441 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 849 (1971); Simmons v. State, 233 Ga. 429 211 S.E.2d 725 (1975); State v. Chakos, 74 Wash.
2d 154, 443 P.2d 815 (1968), cert. denied, sub nom. Christofferson v. Washington, 393 U.S. 1090
(1969); State v. Smyth, 7 Wash. App. 50, 499 P.2d 63 (1972).
4 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c); OHIto CRIM. CODE R. 41(c) (Baldwin, 1973); PA. R.
CRIM. P. 2003; VT. R. CRINM. P. 41.1(c) (1974).
5 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-205 (1947, 1975 Cum. Supp.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 163303 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 542.276 (Vernon 1974 Supp.).
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corners" rule which requires contemporaneous recordation of facts
underlying a finding of probable cause, courts have seldom indicated that
such a procedure is constitutionally required. For example, in United
States ex rel. Gaugler v. Brierley,6 the Third Circuit held that in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a state conviction, sworn,
unrecorded oral testimony presented to a state judicial officer while applying for a search warrant may supplement an affidavit which on its face fails
to establish probable cause for the warrant's issuance. In holding that such
a procedure does not violate the fourth amendment, the court emphasized
that "a state has a right to formulate its own rules of procedure in cases
arising out of violations of its criminal laws." 7
The constitutionality of the use of unrecorded testimony given to a
state judicial officer in application for a warrant to supplement a facially
insufficient affidavit has never been decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States However, in spite of the vague wording of the fourth
amendment itself with regard to this question, there are cogent historical
and policy arguments that suggest such a procedure is inconsistent and corruptive of the purpose underlying the amendment itself. The rule requiring
that probable cause be contemporaneously recorded at the time of warrant
issuance would seem to be, of necessity, an implicit element of the fourth
amendment warrant requirement.
II. Recent JudicialConsideration
of the Four CornersDoctrine
There have been a number of cases in the last decade which have
debated whether the four corners rule is constitutionally mandated.' While
courts now uniformly accept the proposition that all facts which are alleged to constitute probable cause must be presented to the issuing magistrate,
a number of these courts assert that not all of those facts must be recorded
at the time of issuance. For example, in Gillespie v. United States,0 the
477 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 525. Moreover, the Gauglercourt held that in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
testimonial and documentary evidence "not contained in the state court record is admissible, thus
permitting a police officer to testify for the first time with regard to sworn unrecorded statements
which he related had been given to the issuing magistrate in support of his search warrant application." Id. at 525, 526.
8 The question has been presented to the Court in petitions for certiorari, but the court has
never accepted such cases for review. See, e.g., State v. Chakos, 74 Wash. 2d 154, 443 P.2d 815
(1968), wherein the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the use of supplementary sworn oral
testimony. The Supreme Court denied certiorari over the dissent of Justices Brennan and Marshall, 393 U.S. 1090 (1969).
9 See generallyAnnot., ProbableCause for Search Warrant,24 A.L.R. Fed. 107 (1975).
10 368 F.2d. 1 (8th Cir. 1966).
6
7
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Eighth Circuit noted that Iowa statutes required the filing of a written information, supported by oath or affirmation, alleging the existence of
grounds specified by the state statute for warrant issuance. The statute also
required the information to state that the applicant believed and had
substantial reason to believe that the grounds existed in fact. The statute
further authorized the magistrate to satisfy himself from his examination
of the applicant and other witnesses as to the existence, or basis to believe
the existence, of the alleged grounds for warrant issuance. The court in
Gillespie held that probable cause need not be shown in the information
itself; rather it might be shown by sworn, unrecorded oral testimony taken
before the magistrate prior to issuance of the warrant and later related at a
suppression hearing.
In Leeper v. United States" the Tenth Circuit held that an otherwise
facially insufficient warrant might be rehabilitated by testimony at a suppression hearing relating to unrecorded, sworn oral statements allegedly
before the magistrate at the time of warrant issuance. In Leeper a United
States Secret Service agent was alleged to have given such unrecorded oral
statements, as well as an affidavit, to the United States Commissioner who
issued the warrant. 2 The court related that the agent had spent approximately one and a half hours with the commissioner before the warrant was
issued, and that when the commissioner was asked upon what grounds he
issued the warrant, he responded that he did so upon, inter alia, the
unrecorded sworn statements of the agent, together with conversations the
commissioner had with the agent. The court rejected the four corners doctrine, opting instead for a more "flexible" approach which would avoid
interpretation of the affidavit in a "hypertechnical manner." The court
emphasized that the commissioner had attempted to fulfill his obligations
as a detached and neutral magistrate by extensively interrogating the
federal agent and that the fact that he failed to record all of the facts he
elicited from the agent during the course of his determined inquiry should
not invalidate the warrant. It seems that the thrust of Leeper and every
other case which has fully considered and rejected the four corners rule is
that such a requirement is not expressly provided for by the Constitution.
These cases hold that in the context of creating rules of criminal procedure
the states should be given broad discretion to create approaches which,
although differing, nevertheless comport with the basic premise underlying
the fourth amendment-suppression of arbitrary and capricious governmental intrusions into the privacy of individual citizens, and the

1 446 F.2d 281 (10thCir. 1971), cert. denied,404 U.S. 1021 (1972).
Id.

12
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maintenance of a bulwark against the garnering of official power in the
hands of the police.
As there exist a number of cases which reject the four corners
doctrine, 3 so also does there exist precedent for the opposite view. United
States v. Anderson 4 was a case where the United States Commissioner
allegedly heard oral testimony at the warrant application but failed to incorporate it into the affidavit which a postal inspector had presented to
him. The court held that all facts and circumstances relied upon for the issuance of a federal warrant must be found in the written affidavit so as to
insure that the commissioner might make an independent judgment of probable cause, and so that the reviewing court might determine whether the
fourth amendment requirements had been met without relying on faded
and often confused memories. The court stated that the case illustrated the
very great danger inherent in allowing a magistrate to base his determination of probable cause on unrecorded oral statements. The court pointed to
an important contradiction in the testimony of the commissioner and the
postal inspector as to whether an oath had been properly administered.
The court also indicated that there had been adequate time to reduce the
oral statements to writing.
13 Id. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gaugler v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973);
Boyer v. Arizona, 455 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1972); Radcliff v. Cardwell, 446 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir.
1971); United States v. Berkus, 428 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1970); Naples v. Maxwell, 393 F.2d 615
(6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1080 (1969); Dewitt v. United States, 383 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.
1967); United States ex rel. Schnitzler v. Follette, 379 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1967); Lopez v. United
States, 370 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1966); Miller v. Sigler, 353 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 980 (1966); United States ex rel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 441 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971). See also United States v.
Babich, 347 F. Supp. 157 (D. Nev. 1972), which held that where the affidavit on its face was merely ambiguous rather than insufficient, unrecorded oral testimony might be used as clarification.
Compare Perial Amusement Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973), a case decided after the
1972 amendment to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 41, both before and
after the 1972 amendment, provided that a "warrant shall issue only on an affidavit or affidavits
sworn to before the federal magistrate or state judge and establishing the grounds for issuing the
warrant." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c). In the 1972 amendment the warrant issuing officer was
specifically authorized to consider oral testimony; but the amended rule requires such testimony to
be "taken down by a court recorder or recording equipment and made part of the affidavit." A
number of presently existing federal statutes, however, authorize the issuance of search warrants
while not requiring an affidavit or sworn document. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 150ff. (1976), authorizing the issuance of search warrants with respect to enforcement of the Plant Pest Act; 16 U.S.C. §
668b(a) (Supp. V 1975), authorizing search warrants with regard to federal statutory provisions
designed to insure the protection of bald eagles; 16 U.S.C. § 852d (a) (1970), authorizing issuance
of search warrants with regard to regulating interstate transportation of fish and game; 19 U.S.C.
§ 1595(a) (1970), concerning warrants to search for smuggled goods; 31 U.SC. § 1105, search
warrant issuance pertaining to transportation of monetary instruments in interstate or foreign
commerce. The warrant procedure authorized by these statutes are not governed by Rule 41(c).
14 453 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Most pointedly, in Glodowski v. State, 5 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court stated:
It is an anomaly in judicial procedure to attempt to review the judicial act of
a magistrate issuing a search warrant upon a record made up wholly or partially by oral testimony taken in the reviewing court long after the search
warrant issued. Judicial action must be reviewed upon the record made
at.. .the time that the judicial act was performed. The validity of judicial action cannot be made to depend upon the facts recalled by fallible human
memory at a time somewhat removed from that when the judicial determination was made. The record of the facts presented to the magistrate need take
no particular form. The record may consist of the sworn complaint, of affidavits, or of sworn testimony taken in shorthand and later filed, or of
testimony reduced to longhand and filed, or of a combination of all of these
forms of proof. The form is immaterial. The essential thing is that proof be
reduced to permanent form and made
a part of the record which may be
6
transmitted to the reviewing court.1
Glodowski was cited by Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissent to the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Christofferson v. Washington,
wherein the Justice urged that "the substantive right created by the requirement of probable cause is hardly afforded full sweep without an effective procedural means of assuring meaningful review of a determination
by the issuing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Reliance on a
record prepared after the fact involves a hazard of impairment of the
97
right.'
Thus, the cases presently stand divided, with substantial authority for
the position that probable cause need not be recorded prior to warrant issuance within the four corners of the relevant affidavit, information, or
other official document of record.
It would seem, then, that an inquiry into the historical background of
the fourth amendment would be in order to determine if there is other
evidence that might be brought to bear upon the conflicting policy
arguments and statutory interpretation which constitute, in the main, most
of the judicial dialogue on the issue.

Is196 Wis. 265, 220 N.W. 227 (1928).
16 Id. at 271-72, 220 N.W. at 230.
'7 393 U.S. 1090-91 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Justice Marshall joined in the dissent.
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III. The FourthAmendment WarrantRequirement
In HistoricalContext

The Pre-RevolutionaryWar Anglo-American Experience
English Common Law Development
Although the antecedents of the fourth amendment may properly be
traced to Biblical times," the inquiry here will begin in England several

centuries prior to the American Revolution. The legislative history of the
English law of search and seizure can be traced to the regulation of
customs in the fourteenth century. 9 A later development was the practice
of granting a general search power to certain organized trades as an aid in
enforcement of their many regulations. This practice probably originated
during the reign of Henry III (1422-1461).2" It was subsequently adopted by

Parliament and the court of Star Chamber."' During the Elizabethan and
Stuart periods oppressive laws relating to religion, printing, and seditious
libel and treason were the subject of rigorous enforcement. 2 For example,

in the mid-sixteenth century the Star Chamber granted agents of the Stationers' Company23 authority to search any warehouse, shop, or any other

place where they suspected a printing law violation existed; authority was
granted to seize any books printed contrary to law and to bring any
suspected offender before the courts. 4
During the next century, the failure of these measures to suppress illicit printing activity resulted in even more oppressive Star Chamber
decrees which increased penalties, provided for more strict censorship, and
Is See, e.g., N. LASSON,

THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENTOFTHE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 13-24 (Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political
Science, ser. 55, No. 2, 1937) (hereinafter cited as LASSON]; M.RADIN, ROMAN LAW, 475-76 (1927);
5 M.RODKINSON, THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD 158 (1918); W.DAVIES, CODES OF HAMMORABI AND
MOSES (1915). Clearly, the constitutionally exalted position of privacy and integrity of the home
and person ("a man's home is his castle") did not originate with the development of English law.
An example of ancient solicitude of such interests is noted in Article 21 of the Code of Hammurabi
which allows: "If a man makes a breach into a house, one shall kill him in front of the breach, and
bury him in it." W. DAVIES, CODES OF HAMMURABI AND MOSES, 33 (1915). See also A. KOCOUREK
& J.WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW 395 (1915).
19 LASSON, supra note 18, at 23. See 9 Edw. 111,
St. II ch. 11, which provided that

innkeepers in seaports were to search guests for counterfeit money smuggled into the country from
abroad, one quarter the value of which would be a reward to the successful searcher.
20 LASSON, supra note 18, at 23-24. See II Hen. VII, ch, 27; The Act 39 Eliz. 1, ch. 13
(1597).
21 LASSON, supra note 18, at 24.
22 Id.
23 See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 362 (3d ed. 1926); W. RINoLE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS, § 2, (1972); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 20-21 (1966).
24 LASSON, supranote 18 at25.
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similar unlimited powers of search and seizure.25 Contemporaneously the
Privy Council and its related Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission zealously sought to detect and punish seditious libel, nonconformism
and like offenses. Professor Lasson, in his well-documented analysis of the
period, notes that:
No limitations seem to have been observed in giving messengers powers of
search and arrest in ferreting out offenders and evidence. Persons and places
were not necessarily specified, seizure of papers and effects was indiscriminate, everything was left to the discretion of the bearer of the warrant. Oath and probable cause, of course, had no place in such warrants,
which were so general that they could be issued upon the merest rumor with
no evidence to support them and indeed for the very purpose of possibly
securing some evidence in order to support a charge.26
Writs of assistance, a permanent type of general search warrant used in the
customs service developed from the similar practices of the Privy
Council.27 Escalating repression of what we now call "civil liberties" and
attempts by the Crown to extract onerous customs duties resulted in growing public resentment and dissatisfaction.
In the 1640's this unrest led, at least in part, to an armed struggle
between Charles I and Parliament which resulted ultimately in the execution of the King in 1649, and eventually parliamentary supremacy over the
monarchy.2"
The ascendency of Parliament, however, did not result in alleviation
of the suppression of civil rights. On the contrary, the parliamentary
regime continued in large measure the same practices which had brought
public condemnation of monarchial rule.29
This was so in spite of contemporaneous development of English
common law principles, largely ignored by Parliament, which indicate that
the chief limitations on search and seizure embodied in the fourth amendment were already accepted by the English common law.30 Thus, Chief
25 Id. See E. ARBER, TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF
LONDON 807 (1894); J. TANNER, TUDOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 282-83 (1922). See also The

Act 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33 (1662).
26 LASSON, supra note 18, at 26.
27
28

Id. at 28-29.

After the execution of Charles I, England was ruled by Parliament presided over by
Oliver Cromwell, designated "Lord Protector." The Stuarts' reign was restored in 1660 when
Charles II assumed the throne. The revolution of 1688 confirmed the predominant position of
Parliament.
29 See LASSON, supra note 18, at 33. The licensing act for regulation of the press, enacted
shortly after the Restoration, contained provisions for search and seizure just as broad as those
granted by the decrees of Star Chamber, 13 and 14 Car. II, ch. 33 § 15.
30 See generally2 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1847) [hereinafter cited
as HALE]; LASSON, supra note 18, at 35.
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Justice Hale, in his authoritative seventeenth-century treatise on English
criminal law,"' held that a general arrest warrant which commanded the
seizure of all persons suspected of committing a criminal act was void and
could not be used in defense to a suit for false imprisonment. 2 A party
seeking a warrant, Hale indicated, must be examined by the justice of the
peace under oath to determine the nature of the accusation and whether the
suspicions of the warrant seeker were reasonable.3 3 The examination of
the party demanding the arrest warrant was to be recorded in writing. 4 The
warrant also was required to specify by name or description the particular
person to be arrested. Thus, Hale suggests that it was good form for the
justice to record information underlying issuance of an arrest warrant."
Hale does not indicate whether a similar recording was required by English
31 For a critical examination of Hale's work, see HOLDSWORTH,
32 1 HALE, supra note 30, at 580; 2 HALE at 112, 150.

supra note 23, at 574-95.

Id., 2 HALE, supra note 30, at 110.
Id. ButseeJohn Wilkes Case, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 981 (1763). John Wilkes, a member of
Parliament and a noted critic of the King's government, was arrested pursuant to a general warrant which directed agents of the Secretary of State to search for and arrest the authors of a
"treasonous and seditious" newspaper called The North Briton. The warrant also authorized the
search for and seizure of personal papers of such persons. Notwithstanding Hale's statement that
it was good practice to take down in writing the evidence supporting warrant issuance, Chief
Justice Pratt (later Lord Camden) rejected Wilkes' claim on habeas corpus that such a written
statement of the evidence was essential to the warrant's validity. Wilkes was discharged on another
ground.
35 Support for Hale's position is found in a short-lived statute of Charles I1which provided
in pertinent part: "Whereas by the ancient and fundamental laws of this realm, in case where any
person is...arrested by any writ,...issuing out of any of his majesty's courts...the true cause of action ought to be set forth and particularly expressed in such writ ...whereby the defendant may
have certain knowledge of the cause of the suit, and the officer who shall execute such writ ...
may
know how to take security for the appearance of the defendant to the same, and the sureties for
such appearances may rightly understand for what cause they become engaged; (2) and whereas
there is a great complaint among the people of this realm, that for divers years now last post very
many of his majesty's good subjects have been arrested upon general writs of trespass.. .not expressing any particular or certain course of action,...31 Charles Sat. 11,Chap. 11,
8 Stat. at Large
27 (1661)."
The early common law rule recognized an exception to the arrest warrant requirement; a
peace officer could arrest without a warrant for a felony or misdemeanor committed in his
presence, as well as for a felony not committed in his presence, if he had reasonable grounds for
making the arrest. Warrantless felony arrests have recently been sanctioned by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). See also ALl, A MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRECEDURE 289, 303 (1975), which supports this view. But see dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall in Watson, which notes that only a few crimes were considered
serious enough to be called felonies. Id. As Hale suggests, to make an arrest for most crimes at
common law, the police officer was required to obtain a warrant unless the crime was committed
in his presence. To the extent that the Watson Court suggests that warrantless arrests were the
general English common law rule, it is simply historically wrong. In any case, Watson does not
and cannot reasonably suggest a similar rule for search warrants. See concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Powell. Id. at 427-32.
33

34
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search warrant procedure. It is clear, however, that the issuance of search
warrants to recover stolen goods at the instance of the victim of theft required the warrant seeker to testify under oath before the justice that a
felony had been committed; that he could "show the cause of his suspicion"; that the goods were in a place certain, 6 and he was required to
relate to the justice the facts underlying his suspicions. 7 It has been said
that it was the general practice of English magistrates to take affidavits of
charges so they might retain proof of the justification they had for issuing

the warrant."
If either an arrest or a search warrant were found later to be
unlawfully obtained or executed (for example, the warrant issued without
probable cause), the person who sought and obtained the warrant, or the
justice of the peace who issued it might be held civilly liable and required to
pay damages to the person aggrieved. 9
Notwithstanding the thoughtful exhortations of distinguished
English commentators and jurists to place restrictions on the indiscriminate use of search and arrest warrants, the use of general warrants
was not uncommon and was often sustained by the courts in the one hundred and fifty years preceding the American Revolution.4" The impact of
the development of common law safeguards against oppressive search and
seizure was also perhaps muted by the practical operation of the English
magisterial system:
36 2 HALE, supra note 30, at 113. It should be mentioned that Hale disavows Lord Coke's
earlier rejection of the argument that a justice of the peace should be permitted to issue search or
arrest warrants on mere suspicion. Coke had stated: "That justices of the peace have no power
upon a pure surmise to break open any man's house to search for a felon or stolen goods either in
the day or night." The use of carefully circumscribed search warrants, argued Hale, had become
acceptable and necessary elements of criminal procedure. See also 4 E. COKE, INSTITUTE OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 176-77 (167 1); and comment of the editor, HALE, id. at 110: "Yet inasmuch as
justices of peace claim this power rather by connivance than by express warrant of law, and since
the undue execution of it may prove so highly prejudicial to the reputation as well as the liberty of
the party, a justice of the peace cannot well be too tender in his proceedings of this kind, and seems
to be punishable not only at the suit of the using, but also of the party grieved if he grant any such
warrant groundlessly and maliciously, without such a probable cause, as might induce a candid
and impartial man to suspect the party to be guilty. Coke and Hale seem to disapprove of such
warrants granted only upon suspicion, and the old books seem generally to disallow all arrests for
the suspicion of felony...except the very person who hath the suspicion...."
37 Id. It is "convenient," Hale added, that the warrant should state that search be made in
the daytime, that no doors be broken open and that the goods not be delivered to the complainant
unless and until a court order issues. Id. at 113-15, 149-51.
38 Welsh v. Scott, 27 N.C. 57, 60, 5 Ired. 72, 76 (1844).
39 2 HALE, supra note 30, at 110 n.2, 116 n.19, 150 n.5; 1 HALE, supra, note 30 at 577-82.
In some situations the officer who executed the warrant could be liable. See also 2 J. CHITTY, THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 156 (1835); 3 VINERS, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 530
(16-).
40 See generally the comments of Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St.
Tr. 1029 (1765).
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They [Justices of the Peace] raised the hue and cry, chased criminals,
searched houses, took prisoners. A Justice of the Peace might issue the warrant for arrest, conduct the search himself, effect the capture, examine the
accused, and summon witnesses, extract a confession by cajoling as friend
and bullying as magistrate, commit him, and finally give damning evidence
on trial. 4'
The political struggle between King and Parliament during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the concomitant imperfections of the
day-to-day operations of the minor judiciary militated against the effectiveness of procedural safeguards which might otherwise have substantially
deterred warrant abuses. In spite of this it does seem evident that the rationale of English common law development of search and seizure
restraints was, in theory at least, very similar to the notions underlying the
fourth amendment. English judges were generally of the view that placing
unbridled power to search and seize in the hands of the government was
antithetical to the maintenance of the rather unique (for their time)
freedoms that English subjects had come to enjoy. Thus it was that Chief
Justice Hale suggested a number of devices to limit the power to search and
seize, including a four corners-like recording requirement in the instance of
arrest warrant issuance.42 While such admonitions may have had little impact on the magisterial practices of the day, it is evident that such considerations were extant long before the formulation of the fourth amendment.
ColonialResentment and the Writs of Assistance
It was not until the first waves of unrest in the American colonies
were felt on English shores that British courts took search and seizure practices firmly in rein. Ironically, as American resentment of general warrants
increased to a crescendo of revolutionary fervor, the English themselves
were in the process of abandoning the use of the general warrant.
Entick v. Carrington,3 decided in 1765, was a trespass action involving a general search warrant which directed that agents of the Secretary of
State search for and seize certain personal papers of the plaintiff John Entick. The search and seizure was premised on the general assertion that Entick had authored a paper which was allegedly libelous to the King and his
41

J. POLLACK, THE POPISH PLOT 267 (1903). See also LASSON, supra note 18, at 36 n.86;

STEPHEN, A HISTORY OFTHE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
42 HALE, supra note 30, and accompanying text.

J.

221 (1883).

As to some felonies, however, a general
statement in the warrant noting the nature of the offense was held to be sufficient.
43 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765). See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Entick has been called a landmark of English liberty, Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 381 (1974).
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government. In upholding Entick's claim, Lord Camden rejected the
Crown's assertion that there had been ample precedent for the use of the
general warrant since the days of Star Chamber, and that the right to issue
such warrants had not been challenged:
But still it is insisted, that there has been a general submission, and no action
brought to try the right. I answer, there has been a submission of guilt and
poverty to power and the terror of punishment. But it would be strange doctrine to assert that all the people of this land are bound to acknowledge that
to be universal law, which a few criminal booksellers have been afraid to
dispute."
The court analogized Entick, which involved a warrant to search for
evidence of libel, to cases regarding search warrants issued for the recovery
of stolen goods.4 ' The former was a criminal proceeding prosecuted by the
government, while the latter was generally a private action by an aggrieved
citizen who sought to recover his own property. The court emphasized that
the issuance of search warrants for stolen goods "crept into the law by imperceptible practice" and that Lord Coke had denied its legality
altogether.46
Accepting arguendo the legality of search warrants for stolen goods,
the court emphasized that the law placed rigorous safeguards on their use:
There must be a full charge upon oath of a theft committed.-The owner
must swear that the goods are lodged in such a place.-He must attend at the
execution of the warrant to shew them to the officer, who must see that they
answer the description.-And, lastly, the owner must abide the event at his
peril: for if the goods are not found, he is a trespasser; and the officer being
an innocent person, will be always a ready and convenient witness against
him.47

No similar safeguards attached to the procedure advocated by the
defendants for issuance of warrants to search for evidence.
In holding that general warrants to search for evidence of libel were
illegal, Lord Camden noted: "[I]f this point should be determined in
favour of the jurisdiction, the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject
in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search and inspection of a
44 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029, 1068 (1765).
45 Id. at 1066-68. The Court noted that a primary difference between the two was that
"[In the one, I am permitted to seize my own goods, which are placed in the hands of a public officer, till the felon's conviction shall intitle me to restitution. In the other, the party's own property
is seized before and without conviction, and he has no power to reclaim his goods, even after his
innocence is cleared by acquittal." Id. at 1066.
46 Id. at 1067. See also4 COKE,INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 176 (1671).
47 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1067 (1765).
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messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even
to suspect, a person.... 48
This disfavor of general warrants in the mother country, and
developing restraints on search and seizure activity, however, did not extend to England's treatment of its American cousins who were treated as
less than first-class citizens of the realm.
The Massachusetts Bay Province was the situs of the first serious friction between England and her American colonies. That controversy, which
concerned the writ of assistance 49 form of general search warrant used by
British customs officials," has been identified as "the first in the
chain of events which led directly and irresistibly to revolution and
independence.'"
Most of the important events concerning the writs of assistance took
place in the Massachusetts Bay Province. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the practice of American customs officers in Massachusetts
and many other colonies had been to enter buildings forcibly by the mere
authority of their commissions. 2 This practice went unopposed in the colonies for a long period: "Indeed, from 1748 to 1756, the Massachusetts
legislature itself had provided that collectors of provincial duties... had the
right to search wherever their suspicion directed for wines and spirits upon
which the local duty had not been paid." 53
48 Id. at 1063. See also Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763); Huckle v. Money, 2
Wils. K.B. 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763), which dealt with the controversy surrounding John
Wilkes' struggle against the ministers and policies of George II1. In the latter case, Chief Justice

Pratt, later Lord Camden, held a general warrant to be illegal, stating that "ITlo enter a man's
house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition." In Huckle and later cases arising from the Crown's illegal search and seizure of
Wilkes' home and papers, juries returned verdicts including exemplary damages totaling 100,000
pounds (an incredible sum for that time), reflecting the jurors' outrage at the general warrant pro-

cedures. See LASSON, supra note 18, at 43-47. Seegenerally2 T.

MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

OF ENGLAND 245-52 (1864).
49 These writs received their name from the fact that they commanded all English subjects
to assist in their execution. This assistance (which was not the objectionable aspect of the writ) on-

ly required that one see that customs officers were not hindered in the performance of their duties;
no assistance in unloading cargos or the like was required. Noncompliance with the writ constituted a contempt of court. See LASSON, supra note 18, at 53-54.
50 Hart, American History Leaflets, No. 33, Introduction, quoted in LASSON, supra note

18, at 51. See QUINCY,

REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 1761-1772, at 395-540 (App. I, Horace Gray's notes) (1865)

[hereinafter cited as QUINCY], for an extensive contemporary account of the history of the writs of
assistance in the colonies; LASSON, supra note 18, at 51-78, and citations contained therein,
sI See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 18, at 51-78; 2 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 523-24 (1850); T.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 364 (6th ed. 1890).
52 LASSON, supra note 18, at 56.
53 Id. at 66.
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English customs duties and attendant powers of search and seizure
had not been vigorously enforced in America until the outset of the Seven
Years War with France, an event which necessitated strict enforcement of
English trade laws in the British colonies. The effect of such enforcement
was felt on American trade with the French West Indies and other areas.
This trade, which had for so long been virtually ignored by London and
had become a mainstay of the New England colonies' economy, almost
overnight became a heinous offense-smuggling enemy goods. From 1760
until the outbreak of the American Revolution a decade and a half later,
the English used the writs of assistance in an effort to curtail wartime
smuggling and as a tool in enforcing revenue-raising importation duties. 4
Reflections On the Import of EarlyEnglish WarrantProcedures
From the above discussion of the early Anglo-American search and
seizure experience, certain conclusions may be drawn. It seems clear that
there is no direct historical evidence that a four corners requirement was
accepted procedure in seventeenth and eighteenth-century England. This is
not surprising for, as noted above, English history during that period is in
large part an account of the constant conflict between and among king,
Parliament, courts, and citizens over the rights and roles of each in a society evolving uncertainly from the repressions of centuries of absolute
monarchy. We do know from Blackstone and Hale that four corners requirements were represented to be the best practice in issuance of warrants
of arrest or jail commitment. 5 The purpose of making a record of the
grounds for warrant issuance was that a record was essential for effective
habeas corpus review." The early commentators indicate that an oath and
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant to recover stolen goods
was required, but there is no mention of a recording requirement similar to
that which attached to arrest and jail commitment procedure. There are
several plausible reasons for this disparity of treatment.
54 See id., at 51-78; QUINCY, supra note 50; Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of
the Revolution, in THE ERA ATTHE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40-75 (R. Morris ed. 1939). Colonial

attorneys attacked the writs of assistance on various grounds, including failure to indicate with
specificity the place to be searched. Paxton's Case, QuINcY, supra note 50, at 51. It also appears
that American judges in most of the colonies refused in large measure to issue writs of assistance
or general warrants. QUINCY, supra note 50 app. I, at 500.
55 See text accompanying notes 30-38, supra.
56 Id. See also Bushell's Case, 6 Howell's St. Tr. 999, 1002 (1670). It was the duty of
magistrates at common law and later by statute to cause their clerks to write down the verbatim
material testimony of witnesses in any proceeding where jail commitment might follow. CHrTTY,
supra note 39, at 189. See also Stat. of 3 Geo. 4. c. 23 (1822); M. BACON,
(Gwyllim ed. 1856); Tracey v. Williams, 4 Conn. 107 (1821).

THE LAW

A NEW ABRIDGEMENTOF

OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW

[Vol.31:289

There seemed to have been no practical necessity for a recording of
probable cause in the search warrant context. There would be no judicial
review of the magistrates' action similar to habeas corpus review. There
was no notion of nor legal basis for the procedure that we today call a
"suppression hearing." As a matter of fact the warrant for recovery of
stolen goods was primarily a remedy utilized by private citizens rather than
by government prosecutors. The remedy for erroneously obtaining a
search warrant for recovery of stolen goods was an action in trespass. As
noted above, the right to recover in a trespass action was established rather
simply: the person seeking the warrant accompanied the officer to the
alleged situs of the stolen goods and pointed them out. If the search failed
to locate the stolen items, a cause of action would accrue to the person
whose premises were searched, and the official conducting the search
would likely testify on behalf of the plaintiff. In brief, there was no reason
to make a record of the cause upon which the search warrant issued.
As to the issuance of general warrants and writs of assistance, the
government was bound by almost no procedural restraints similar to those
pertaining to warrants to search for stolen goods, until the time of Entick
v. Carrington.
It is evident that the procedures utilized by English common law
courts to restrain the arbitrary exercises of official power met with mixed
success at best. Moreover, although the Supreme Court of the United
States has recently suggested that the early English procedures governing
issuance of warrants for recovery of stolen goods, and warrants of arrest
and commitment were regarded by the Framers of the Bill of Rights as a
model for reasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment, it
can hardly be argued that the Framers regarded English common law procedures as a bulwark against government repression. The various provisions of the Bill of Rights stand as poignant testimony to the failure of the
English common law to effectively restrain the power of government. It
was precisely because of this failure that the Bill of Rights was conceived
and adopted as an essential corollary to the Constitution of the United
States. While some aspects of the Bill of Rights may indeed have been
derived from the precepts or practices of the English common law, it cannot reasonably be argued that such procedures were intended to mark the
outer limits of the protection afforded by the first ten amendments.
FormulationandRatificationof the FourthAmendment
That the roots of the American Revolution are deeply imbedded in
colonial resentment of the enforcement of British trade regulations needs
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no documentation. 7 Thus it was that the abuses of the writs of assistance
and general warrants were fresh in the minds of the men upon whom
devolved the task of creating a new nation-a nation which would, in the
words of the Declaration of Independence, "provide new Guards for their
future security." 58
Colonial leaders wasted no time in providing a legal foundation upon
which to base the protection of individual rights which had been trammeled by the government of George III. Starting in 1776 with the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, every former colony in America (with the exception
of New Jersey) adopted some provision relating to search and seizure in
their various state declarations or bills of rights. 9 None of those
documents, however, incorporated an explicit four corners requirement.
Seven state formulations closely approximated the language and emphasis of the fourth amendment, which was drafted almost fifteen years
later.' During this fifteen-year hiatus, which culminated in the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, state courts also displayed considerable sensitivity to
warrant abuses."
During the period when the relationships between the former colonies
were governed by the Articles of Confederation, the national government
was weak and was perceived by most to pose little threat to individual liberty. When the clamor for a more effective central government resulted in
the summoning of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787,
57 The Molasses Act, Stamp Act, Townshend Acts, and Boston Tea Party are an integral
part of the American experience so ingrained in generations of grammar school students as to have
become synonymous with the Revolution itself. See T. HALIBURTON, RULE AND MISRULE OF THE
ENGLISH INAMERICA (185 1).
58 In relating his youthful exposure to James Otis' famous denunciation of general warrants (1762), John Adams emphasizes the import of the general warrant issue in the development
of revolutionary sentiment: "I do say in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Otis' oration against
the Writs of Assistance breathed into this nation the breath of Life. [Otis] was a flame of fire.
Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against
Writs of Assistance... .Then and there the child Independence was born. In 15 years, namely in
1776, he grew to manhood, and declared himself free." C. ADAMS, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 247-48, 276 (1858) [hereinafter cited as ADAMS].
59 LASSON, supra note 18, at 80. Article X of the Virginia Bill of Rights provided: "That
general warrants whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places
without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons named, or whose offense is
not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not
be granted."
60 LASSON, supra note 18, at 79-81. See also R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 42 (1955); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 4142 (1969).
61 See, e.g., Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787). In Frisbie,a case in trespass arising from an illegal search, one issue raised by the plaintiff but not decided was the validity of
granting a warrant upon a mere oral complaint. See also2 ADAMS, supra note 58, at 124.

OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW

[Vol.31:289

many of the most able and eminent men in America met and drafted not a
revision of the unsatisfactory Articles of Confederation, but rather a completely new system that included the creation of a strong central government which was granted extensive powers, the exercise of which could
directly affect the lives and labors of the people.62 In spite of the fact that
governmental intrusion into the lives of citizens and infringement on fundamental liberties were major factors in the American colonies' break with
Great Britain, astonishingly enough it was not until the waning moments
of the Federal Constitutional Convention that the notion of a bill of rights
was entertained by the delegates. The existing records of the proceedings of
the Convention indicate that the question of a bill of rights was not considered until five days before adjournment and then only with regard to a
collateral matter.6 3
George Mason and Elbridge Gerry led the belated move to have the
Convention consider inclusion of a bill of rights as part of the seminal
document. The Convention rather perfunctorily rejected this suggestion
after only brief argument to the effect that the specific delegated power of
the central government did not extend to regulation of such things as
religion and the press, and that the bills of rights enacted by the states provided adequate safeguards.' This amazing inadvertence played into the
hands of the opponents of the Constitution, who used it as a weapon in the
acrimonious struggle over ratification which followed immediately on the
heels of the adjournment of the Philadelphia conclave.65
Patrick Henry, the leader of the opposition in Virginia, used his
gifted oratory to suggest the possible impact of the omission of a bill of
62 LASSON,

63

supra note 18, at 83.

Id. at 83-86, See 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 540-41 (Ford ed. 1904-

37); 3 M. FARRAND RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION 128-29 1911).
64 Only a month and a half after adjournment of the Federal Constitutional Convention,
the Pennsylvania convention summoned to consider the proposed Constitution queried James
Wilson, a leading advocate of the document at the federal convention, as to the reason for its
omission of a bill of rights. Wilson responded: "The truth is sir, that this circumstance, which has
occasioned so much clamor and debate, never struck the mind of any member...till, I believe,
within three days of the dissolution of that body, and even then of so little account was the idea
that it passed off in a short conversation without assuming a formal debate...." LASSON, supra
note 18, at 86, citing J. MCMASTER & STONE, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 251
(1888). See also MITCHELL, A BIOGRAPHYOFTHE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES 188 (1964).
65 Both George Mason and Elbridge Gerry opposed ratification on the ground that the
Constitution did not contain a bill of rights. The search and seizure issue was the first example used
by both to show the necessity of such a reservation of rights in the people. Gerry, arguing against
Massachusetts ratification, emphasized: "I cannot pass over in silence the insecurity in which we
are left with regard to warrants unsupported by evidence-the daring experiment of granting writs
of assistance...is not yet forgotten in Massachusetts." LASSON, supra note 18, at 89, citing THE
FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS 689-90 (Scott ed. 1894).
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rights, alluding to the potential abuses that federal sheriffs might commit
while acting under minimal oversight of distant superiors:
When these harpies are aided by excisemen, who may search, at any time,
your house and most secret recesses, will the people bear it?...Where I
thought there was a possibility of such mischiefs, I would grant such power
with a niggardly hand; and here there is a strong possibility that these oppressions shall actually happen.66
The rising crescendo of opposition to ratification quickly brought forth a
willingness to compromise on the part of the Constitution's advocates.
They promised that a bill of rights would be added by amendment as soon
as possible after ratification. After such assurances were made known,
ratification quickly followed, as did subsequent adoption of the first ten
amendments .67
The language of the fourth amendment was chosen from competing
versions of bills and declarations of rights of the states. Some models forbade only general warrants, some proscribed both unreasonable searches
and seizures as well as general warrants, and some "split the difference,"
so to speak.68
An examination of the literal terms of the fourth amendment does
not, of course, reveal the precise scope of protection it was intended to provide. What is obvious on the face of the fourth amendment, however, has
been confirmed by historians and legal scholars who have analyzed contemporary accounts of its drafting and adoption. It is clear that the second,
or warrant clause of the amendment was intended to prohibit the use of
general warrants and writs of assistance. The distaste of colonial
Americans for these tools of English oppression is well documented. If the
amendment had been directed exclusively to general warrant abuses of the
English, it would have been unnecessary for the Framers to go beyond the
warrant procedure (oath, probable cause, and particularity of description
of persons, places, and things) set forth in its second clause. 69 The first
clause of the amendment, however, assures the security of the people in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The language of the first clause has led to the generally ac-

66 LASSON,

67

supra note 18, at 92, citing McMASTER & STONE, supra note 64, at 58.

See generallyLASSON, supra note

18, at 88-105; E.: DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES 458 (1964); C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT 185 (1925); J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Holmes

devise) 414 (1971); TAYLOR, supra, note 60, at 43.
68 Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 399 n.465. See also LASSON, supra note 18, at 79-82.
69 Amsterdam, id.at 399; LASSON, id. at 103; Taylor, supra, note 60, at 43.
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cepted assumption that the protective sweep of the amendment is broader
in scope than a mere prohibition of general warrants. Professor Lasson has
stated that "[tihe general right of security from unreasonable search and
seizure was given a sanction of its own [in the first clause] and thus intentionally given a broader scope." 70 Even Professor Telford Taylor, who has
argued with much ardor that the Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth
amendment too broadly, concedes that the first clause of the amendment
was "[q]uite possibly.. .to cover shortcomings in warrants other than those
specified in the second clause; quite possibly it was to cover other unforseeable consequences."'" It seems apparent that the first clause of the
amendment extended its coverage beyond the then contemporary evils with
which the Framers were acquainted.
As Professor Amsterdam has so aptly explained it:
Growth is what statesmen expect of a constitution. Those who wrote and
ratified the Bill of Rights had been through a revolution and knew that times
change. They were embarked on a perilous course toward an uncertain
future and had no comfortable assurance what lay ahead. To suppose they
meant to preserve to their posterity by guarantees of liberty written with the
broadest latitude nothing more than hedges against the recurrence of particular forms of evils suffered at the hands of a monarchy beyond the sea
seems to me implausible in the extreme .... The revolutionary statesmen were
plainly and deeply concerned with losing liberty. That is what the Bill of
7 2

Rights is all about.

This view does no more than recognize a construction of the amendment
accepted by the Supreme Court for almost a century. Such a recognition,
however, does little to resolve the problem confronted in this discussion.
Generalizations concerning the relative breadth or narrowness of the

70 LASSON,

supra note 18, at 103.

71 TAYLOR, supra note 60, at43.

72 Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 399-400.
73 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where Justice Bradley, speaking
for the Court, pushed the scope of the amendment to its farthest extreme, indicating that it expresses "the very essence of constitutional liberty and security....lt is not the breaking of [a person's]...doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it
is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property,
where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,..." 1d. at 630.
The fourth amendment is not the only provision of the Constitution which has been read broadly
by the Court so as not to limit it only to those situations contemplated at the time of its adoption.
See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The [eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) ("In approaching this problem
we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the [fourteenth] Amendment was adopted...."). See
also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417,427 (1885).
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fourth amendment's scope of application does not answer the question
posed here: Is the four corners doctrine a concept necessarily of constitutional dimension?
It does, however, suggest that contrary to the holdings in several recent cases, 4 the absence of a literal reference to a four corners requirement
is not a determinative answer to the question. While it may be quite
reasonable to maintain that the Framers intended to regulate certain oppressive government practices of which they were fully cognizant, it is quite
another thing to argue from their silence that they did not intend the
amendment to reach other practices, the dangers of which were not apparent in 1790. The problem of official attempts to skirt the probable cause
mandate for search warrant issuance in pre-Constitution times had rarely
been an issue; even if such abuses of the canons of the common law had occurred, objections were raised so infrequently and involved so subtle a
nuance that they could scarcely have received attention at a time when
much more common and egregious governmental abuses were the subject
of public controversy. The precise parameters of the words, "no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation"
(or for that matter most constitutional language), were not self-evident in
1790 and are still evolving through the gradual metamorphosis of almost
two centuries of judicial analysis and interpretation. The ability of our
courts to interpret the Constitution would have been limited indeed if they
had accepted the premise that constitutional interpretation must be confined to the document's literal language or to an eighteenth-century conceptual straitjacket. To accept such arguments would be to deny the very
flexibility of construction that has allowed our constitutional system to
confront and resolve a myriad of conflicts, the precise nature of which
could not have been contemplated by the Framers.
Thus, in order to determine whether a four corners requirement
should be considered of constitutional dimension, one should not look only to the literal language of the fourth amendment. Attention should also
be focused upon the early judicial opinions which initially attempted to
grapple with the intricacies of constitutional interpretation. The early
cases, decided as they were by men who had experienced first-hand the
repressions the Bill of Rights was designed to prevent, provide some insight
into the intentions of those who drafted the fourth amendment.

74

See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.

75 SeeKer v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v.

United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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InitialJudicialResponse to the Fourth
Amendment WarrantRequirement
Following its inclusion in the Bill of Rights and until the Supreme
Court made it applicable to the states via the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 75 the courts generally held that the fourth amendment was directed only to searches made under federal authority.76 This
does not mean that the states afforded no protection to the citizen from
capricious searches and arrests by state law enforcement officials. On the
contrary, state courts utilized state constitutional, statutory, and common
law prohibitions to control governmental searches and seizures.
Some states had requirements concerning the drafting of the warrant
that can be seen as attempts to insure that it was issued upon probable
cause. The minimum requirement seems to have been that the warrant be
signed by the issuing magistrate. A number of jurisdictions followed
Blackstone's rule of hand and seal." Other state courts required an oath be
given by the person seeking the warrant, as well as clear identification of
the person or things to be seized. 78 In Frisbe v. Butler,79 the Connecticut
Supreme Court limited searches to places named. Among the errors assigned in Frisbebut not reached by the court was the contention that the
warrant was improperly issued upon mere verbal, rather than written,
complaint. In similar fashion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in Sandford v. Nichols0 awarded damages for a trespass which had
resulted from a search based on a nonspecific warrant; the court failed to
reach the plaintiff's contention that the warrant was void for lack of a written copy of the complaint attached to it.
Thus, from the beginning American courts were concerned that the
issuing magistrate have a sound factual basis before him upon which to
gauge his issuance of a warrant. Moreover, Frisbe and Sandford are further evidence that a four corners doctrine has long been within the contemplation of courts and lawyers alike.
Two early federal cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United
76 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 243 (1833); United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (No. 14,893); Reed
v. Rice, 25 Ky. 44(1829).
77 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *290. SeeTackett v. State, I1 Tenn. 312 (3 Yerger)
392 (1832), which represents an early adoption of this position. Some states quickly dispensed with
this formality; however, see, e.g., Burley v. Griffith, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 442 (1836).
78 Grumon v. Raymond & Betts, I Conn. 39, 6 Am. Dec. 200 (1814); Commonwealth v.
Lottery Tickets, 5 Cush. 369 (Mass. 1850); Humes v. Tabe, I R.I. 464 (1850).
79 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787).
80 13 Mass. 286 (1816).
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2
States are also relevant to our inquiry."' In Ex parte Burford,1
a warrant

was issued by several justices of the peace of the District of Columbia, sitting en banc, for the arrest of one John Burford, who was charged with being "an evil-doer and disturber of the peace of the United States, so that
murder, homicide, strifes, discords... amongst the citizens of the United
States...are likely to arise thereby,..."" Burford was subsequently arrested
and brought before the eleven justices of the peace of the District of Columbia, who required him to provide a surety in the sum of four thousand
dollars (a tremendous sum at that time) for life to insure that he would
keep the peace. When Burford failed to provide such a surety, the justices
4 Burford brought a petition
remanded him to jail until he could provide it."
for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia. The circuit court modified the warrant of commitment to the extent that it reduced the amount of the surety sought from the
petitioner from four thousand to one thousand dollars, and put a one-year
limit upon the period to which Burford would be subject to such security. 5
Judge Cranch, who was at that time both the Supreme Court reporter and
Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Columbia, dissented, insisting that the
prisoner should be released because the warrant of arrest did not state
within its four corners the nature of the testimony leading to its issuance:
"It [the arrest warrant] ought to have stated the names of the persons on
whose testimony it was granted, and the nature of the testimony, so that
this court may know what kind of ill-frame it was, and whether the justices
86
have exercised their discretion properly."
Having lost in the circuit court, Burford brought another petition for
a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court of the United States. 7 In
81 ExparteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); ExparteBurford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448

(1806).
82 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806), rev'g 5 U.S. (ICranch) 276 (C.C.D.C. 1805). The issue
does not appear in any reported opinions until United States v. Tureaud, 20 F. 621 (E.D. La.)
(1884), where a federal district court in Louisiana required warrants to be based on affidavits
which show probable cause. For an explanation of the absence of federal case law on the subject,

see note 87, infra.
83

Id. at450-51.

84 Id. at 449-50.

85 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 276 (1805) rev'd,7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
86

Id. at 278.

In accepting jurisdiction of the case, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the right to seek
habeas corpus relief is constitutionally mandated. Supreme Court jurisdiction was provided for in
the Judiciary Act of 1789. Marshall emphasized, however, that its appellate jurisdiction (excepting
habeas corpus) to review criminal cases is limited to that granted to it by act of Congress and such
jurisdiction had not, at the time, been granted. The import of the failure of Congress to grant appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is that it barred any review of search and seizure questions,
and accounts in substantial measure for the complete absence of fourth amendment precedents until the late nineteenth century when such appellate criminal jurisdiction was finally granted.
87
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reviewing the case, the Court focused its attention not on the warrant of arrest as Judge Cranch had done, but rather on the warrant of jail commitment because it found that the petitioner complained only of the impropriety of the latter.
Citing the fourth amendment admonition "that no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation," Burford's counsel challenged the facial sufficiency of the warrant of commitment:
That warrant states no offense. It does not allege that he was convicted of
any crime. It states merely that he had been brought before a meeting of
many justices, who had required him to find sureties for his good behavior.
It does not charge him of their own knowledge or suspicion, or upon the oath
of any person whomsoever.
It does not allege that witnesses were examined in his presence, or any
other matter whatever, which can be the ground of their order to find
sureties.88

Burford's attorney also placed great emphasis on the necessity that
the regularity of the issuing magistrate's action be reviewable in a habeas
corpus proceeding by reference to a recording of the "cause certain":
If the prisoner had broken jail, it would have been no escape, for the marshall is not answerable, unless a cause certain be contained in the warrant
and the reason given by Blackstone, I Com. 137 why the warrant must state
the cause
of commitment is that it may be examined into upon habeas cor89
pus.

In upholding Burford's argument, which was based on the fourth amendment, Chief Justice Marshall related: "The judges of this court were
unanimously of opinion, that the warrant of commitment was illegal, for
want of stating some good cause certain, supportedby oath.9
If the Constitution requires that the probable cause underlying a warrant of jail commitment be recorded by a magistrate, the conceptual
distance from that procedure to the issuance of search warrants is not a
great one. It is interesting to note that the fourth amendment does not explicitly refer to warrants of jail commitment. On the contrary, the second
88

7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 452 (1806).

89 Id. (emphasis added).
90 Id. at 453. Burford's primary argument had been "that the committment was illegal,

both under the Constitution of Virginia, and that of the United States. It does not state a cause
certain, supported by oath" (emphasis in original). Id. at 451. In upholding this claim Chief
Justice Marshall merely paraphrased Burford's argument. There can therefore be no doubt that
the Court's decision was founded upon the fourth amendment, although it does not explicitly so
indicate.
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clause of the amendment refers to the issuance of warrants which describe
"the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized"-clearly a
reference only to search and arrest warrants-for there is no need for a
warrant of jail commitment to mention places to be searched and persons
or things to be seized. It would be reasonable to argue, then, that the basis
for holding that a written record of the cause of jail commitment is required by the fourth amendment is found in the proscription of
unreasonable searches or seizures contained in its first clause. If a warrant
of jail commitment is constitutionally deficient because of the absence of a
written record of its underlying probable cause, it seems only logical that a
similar rule would attach to search and arrest warrant proceedings which
were the principal and explicit practices toward which the fourth amendment was directed.
Less than one year after ExparteBurford was decided, another petition for a writ of habeas corpus was lodged in the Supreme Court. In Ex
parte Bollman,9" the petitioners had been arrested on treason charges by
military officials in New Orleans and transported to the District of Columbia where they were committed to jail after a hearing before the circuit
court. Bollman claimed inter alia that his incarceration violated the fourth
amendment because it was not based upon probable cause.92 The case turned
upon an analysis of affidavits which had been presented to the circuit court
that purported to evince probable cause. After oral arguments which were
held on seven different days over a nine-day period,9" the Court found that
there was insufficient evidence contained in the affidavits to support a
charge of treason and thus discharged the petitioners. For our purposes,
the most interesting aspect of Ex parte Bollman is its relation of the procedure followed by the circuit court in ordering the petitioners' commitment. The warrant of commitment stated that it was based on probable
cause which was supported by the oath of five men. The oaths referred to
in the warrant of commitment were written affidavits. Four of those affidavits were "sworn to in open court" at the commitment hearing.9
The affidavits were a part of the record of the circuit court; the full

91 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). This was a case of some notoriety. It involved two men,
Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartnout, who were accused of plotting with a former Vice President
of the United States, Aaron Burr, to commit treasonous acts against the government of the United

States.
92 Id. at 110. Bollman's counsel argued that "the question...is whether these affidavits exhibit legal proof of probable cause."
93 Given the extremely heavy caseload of today's Court, it seems incredible that in its
earliest years petitioners could obtain such prompt (two weeks) and extensive review.
948 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75-76 (1807).
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opinion.9"

text of each is appended to the Supreme Court's
In reviewing the
case on Bollman's habeas corpus petition, the Court inquired no further
than an examination of these affidavits and found them insufficient to indicate that a crime had been committed.
We learn, then, from Bollman that as early as 1807 it was apparently
accepted procedure for one seeking a warrant to make statements purporting to constitute probable cause under oath before a judge or
magistrate; this testimony was transcribed and appended to the record in
much the same way that it is done today. The procedure parallels that advocated by Blackstone as a necessary corollary to effective habeas corpus
review. 96 In Ex parte Burford, Chief Justice Marshall had placed a constitutional imprimatur on the practice advocated by Blackstone, even
though it was nowhere mentioned explicitly in the fourth amendment nor
97
had it been widely accepted by English common law authorities.
The early state and federal cases reveal a strong tendency in American
courts to encourage procedural safeguards which protect fourth amendment interests, even though those safeguards were not explicitly required
by the amendment. The four corners-like requirement applied by Chief
Justice Marshall to warrants of jail commitment are indicative of this
tendency. The fact that there, is no indication that a similar four corners
recording requirement was used with regard to issuance of search warrants
should certainly not foreclose later adoption of such a constitutional rule
when circumstances suggest a need for it. In fact, our entire history of
fourth amendment jurisprudence is marked by the Court's preoccupation
with devising reasonable procedures which, although not specifically mentioned in the amendment, vindicate the interests it seeks to protect.
For example, the primary, albeit imperfect, tool utilized by the Court
to deter official disregard for fourth amendment rights is the exclusionary
rule. It was fashioned out of whole cloth by the judiciary, which recognized
that unless sanctions could be applied to encourage compliance with its
mandate, the fourth amendment would pass on to the rhetorical graveyard
where many meritorious precepts are interred. Unlike the exclusionary
rule, the four corners requirement at least has substantial roots imbedded
in early English and American habeas corpus practice.
95 Id. at 455 (appendix A). One of the affidavits was sworn to before another judge at the
time of the petitioner's arrest and was submitted to the circuit court in support of probable cause.
The validity of the latter affidavit was challenged by the petitioners because it had not been sworn
to before the committing judge.
96 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137. See also Bushell's Case, 6 Howell's St. Tr.
999, 1002 (1670).
97 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 453 (1806). In John Wilkes Case, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 981 (1763), the
English Court specifically rejected the assertion that more than a statement of the type of crime
alleged to have been committed should be recorded in writing.
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Adoption of the four corners requirement as a rule of constitutional
stature would clearly not be a departure from the well-established concepts
underlying the evolution of fourth amendment doctrine.
The question narrows, then, to an examination of the arguments for
and against the adoption of the four corners requirement as a constitutional rule in the context of present circumstances. If it is merely one of a
number of ways to reach the same end, it would most likely be rejected as a
rule of general application because of the well-settled policy of allowing
states a large degree of latitude in formulating means to carry out constitutional directives. The discussion which follows focuses on a determination
of this question.
IV. ContemporaryCriminalProcedureand
the Four CornersRequirement
Search WarrantIssuance-CurrentPractices
The most important aspect of current search warrant issuance practice that is relevant to the present inquiry is the ex parte nature of the proceeding: A police officer acting on information he has received appears
before a justice of the peace, a judge, or a magistrate and under oath
relates such information, often by affidavit, to the judicial official. The
magistrate may or may not interrogate the police officer concerning this information;9" if he is satisfied that probable cause exists, he will issue the
warrant. Challenges based upon lack of probable cause in warrant issuance
are usually reviewed in suppression hearings held anywhere from a month
to more than a year after the warrant issues. As noted earlier, at the suppression hearing many courts allow the prosecution to supplement any
written record of the magisterial proceeding with oral testimony elicited
from the participants. Thus, a written record of warrant issuance may indicate on its face that the warrant was invalid because facts contained in
the record do not show probable cause; however, when the written record
is supplemented by additional facts given at the suppression hearing by
police officers or magistrate the warrant's viability may be resurrected.
The primary argument in favor of a four corners requirement is that
this procedure creates a fertile ground for abuse of the constitutional
probable cause mandate. The potential for police misconduct is a fact
rather than a fantasy. There would be no need for a Bill of Rights if
government officials always respected the fundamental rights of citizens;
98 Whether this is done depends upon the prevailing state law or rules of procedure and
upon the circumstances of the case.
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the fourth amendment is merely a confirmation of the existence of the ageold problem of abuse of power by law enforcers. Judge Irving Youngman,
a former federal prosecutor, has well stated what anyone involved in the
criminal justice system is well aware of:
Every lawyer who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury
is common place. The reason is not hard to find. Policemen see themselves as
fighting a two front war-against criminals in the streets and against
"liberal" rules of law in court. All's fair in this war, including the use of perjury to subvert "liberal" rules of law that might free those who "ought" to
be jailed. 99

Intentional subversion of the probable cause requirement through
perjury at suppression hearings is not the only problem with regard to the
ex parte procedures used when search warrants are issued. Because of the
passage of months between warrant issuance and suppression hearing, the
memories of the parties may fail and blurred recollections may not
recognize the distinctions between a number of unrelated proceedings in
which magistrate and police officer may have taken part." If an otherwise
invalid search warrant is resuscitated by a police officer's suppression
testimony, the fact that he has innocently given erroneous information
because of a cloudy memory does not mitigate the constitutional violation.
The Supreme Court has often confirmed that only those facts actually
before the magistrate can be considered in determining whether the probable
cause requirement is fulfilled.'
99 The Perjury Routine, THE NATION (May 8, 1967), at 596-97. See also P. CHEVIONY,
POLICE POWER C.11 (1969); Chevigny, PoliceAbuses in Connection with the Law of Search and
Seizure, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (1969); Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli Harris

Search Warrants and the Possibilityof Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405; Miller & Tiffany,
ProsecutorDominanceof the WarrantDecision: A Study of CurrentPractices,1964 WASH. L.Q.
I; Comment, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
100 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310, 300 A.2d 78, 85 (1973), wherein
Justice Pomeroy dissented from the majority's rejection of a four corners rule. In so doing, he pertinently observed that: "The record in the present case illustrates the hazards inherent in relying on
the memories of those present at the time a warrant issued.... [A]ppellant's suppression hearing
was held more than four months after the challenged search. At that hearing, as the majority opinion states, 'Detective Barbush was initially unable to recall giving any oral testimony whatsoever. The magistrate, while acknowledging the existence of the sworn oral testimony, admitted
that his memory was dimmed by the fact that the proceeding was some time ago.' It is not surprising that the recollections of these witnesses were clouded. During a four month period a policeman
normally makes numerous search warrant requests to a magistrate who must, in every case, make
an independent review of the sworn facts presented to him and determine whether they constitute
probable cause. To expect officer and magistrate to recall with accuracy at some time later what
transpired on each occasion is to place an impossible burden on the individual officials and an
onerous burden on the efficient administration of justice."
101"It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may
consider onlyinformation brought to the magistrate's attention." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
109 n. 1(1964) (emphasis in original).
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The hazards of ex parte proceedings are obvious and substantial. The
cure for such procedural ills is not, however, an adversary proceeding.
Warrant issuance is ex parte for a good reason: an adversary encounter
would be completely inappropriate because the element of surprise is
crucial to the success of a police search.
While ex parte search warrant issuance is necessary, it would seem
that its inherent dangers can easily be ameliorated. The requirement that
the facts giving rise to a probable cause determination be recorded in
writing at the time of warrant issuance merely expands the scope of the
written record demanded by the fourth amendment. While there is no compromise of the ex parte issuance proceeding, the practical import of a four
corners rule would closely resemble the prophylactic effect of explicit constitutional requirements that the warrant contain a written description of
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
There may, however, be very sincere concern that placing a greater
burden on the police officer who must obtain a warrant may have a
counterproductive effect. The American Law Institute, in its Model Code
of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, articulates this concern:
Formulation of a model statute on the issuance of search warrants is
rendered difficult by the pressure of an inherent and basically insoluble inconsistency between improvement of the warrant as a safeguard against
abuse, and the encouragement of its use, in preference to warrantless
searches, on all possible occasions. Almost every effort to "tighten" the warrant procedure, and give meaning to the "neutral magistrate's" scrutiny of
the application, is bound to make it more difficult and time-consuming for
the police officer to get a warrant, and stimulate his resort to a warrantless
basis for the search. 10 2
Having weighed the countervailing considerations, the Institute
nevertheless adopts a four corner requirement, emphasizing that "its
desirability for purposes of informed and effective post-search review is
apparent.""°3
Another argument against a four corners rule has been that it is merely another instance of the type of hypertechnical restriction that some attempt to place on search warrants. These restrictions, so the theory goes,
distort the true purpose of the fourth amendment by placing unreasonable
constraints on procedures which of necessity must retain some modicum of

102

ALl

103

Id. Commentary, § 220.1., at 11.

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975),

at 508.

Commentary on Art. 220,
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flexibility if law enforcement is to keep pace with lawbreakers."0 The short
answer to this suggestion is that while hypertechnicality in reviewing search
warrants may rightfully be condemned, a four corners rule seeks only to
provide a clear record of what transpired when the warrant issued, a factor
which should prove to be a boon to a reviewing court when called upon to
decide if there was a proper basis for warrant issuance.
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has displayed considerable concern that the "criminal justice system is already overburdened by the
volume of cases and the complexities of our system," and that "the early
stages of prosecution generally are marked by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice,"'' 5 it seems quite clear that a four corners requirement would serve to improve rather than exacerbate this situation.
The slight inconvenience that a magistrate's writing or tape recording of
probable cause might provoke would be more than offset by its positive effect. If all of the facts purporting to constitute probable cause are recorded
and no other supplementary evidence may be used, a defense attorney
would know to a reasonable certainty whether a motion to suppress should
be made.
This would contrast greatly with the practice in jurisdictions which
allow supplementary evidence to be given at suppression hearings. In those
states diligent defense counsel will move to suppress if on the face of the
written record of warrant issuance it is arguable that probable cause was
lacking. If, however, all of the facts had been required to be recorded it
might be evident that probable cause existed, thus making it clear that to
contest the point would be an exercise in futility.
V. Conclusion
Requiring as a constitutional rule that probable cause be found
within the four corners of the record of a search warrant issuance proceeding creates no significant problem for the administration of criminal
procedure. Allowing later supplementation of the record serves only to
promote abuse, on the one hand, and challenges to warrant validity on the
104 See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). Said the Court: "[Tlhc
Fourth Amendment commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not
abstract. If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served,
affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested in a commonsense and
realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law
pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts
toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from from submitting their evidence to a
judicial officer before acting," Id. at 108. See alsoUnited States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
105 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 n.23 (1975).
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other. While generally it may be advisable to allow states great latitude in
devising criminal procedures to meet constitutional mandates, the four
corners rule is the only way to effectively curtail the potential for abuse inherent in ex parte search warrant issuance proceedings. Moreover, the four
corners requirement has significant practical advantages over the supplementation rule in that it tends to discourage suppression hearing
challenges.
As Justice Pomeroy of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
cogently argued:
In a different but analogous context the United States Supreme Court has
pertinently observed: "the consequences of failure ... to record the [juvenile
court] proceedings,... may be to throw a burden upon the machinery for
habeas corpus, to saddle the reviewing process with the burden of attempting
to reconstruct a record, and to impose upon the Juvenile Judge the unseemly
duty of testifying under cross-examination as to events that transpired in the
hearings before him." To require a magistrate to reconstruct his grounds for
determining probable cause from what must often be a cloudy memory is
equally "unseemly," and ... both the suppression court and the appellate
6
court are saddled with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a record.'1
The supplementation rule, as reasonable as it may seem at first blush,
is subject to the very astute warning given by Mr. Justice Sutherland fifty
years ago:
The Fourth Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse of power in the
matter of searches and seizures both in England and the colonies; and the
assurance against any revival of it, so carefully embodied in the fundamental
law, is not to be impaired by judicial sanction of equivocal methods, which,
regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality
but
0 7
which, in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right.1
Allowing the prosecution to supplement the record of a search warrant issuance proceeding is a method which runs counter to the interests the
fourth amendment was intended to protect.
106 Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310, 300 A.2d 78, 86 (1973), quoting from In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967). See also, Commission ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105-106,
237 A.2d 196, 197-98 (1968); Comment, Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 60, 181
(1969-70). The practical problems of application of the four corners requirement may be
hypothesized but their resolution will best be achieved in the light of concrete circumstances. Some
of the questions which may arise concern whether a record made wholly by tape-recording, either
in the presence of the magistrate or by telephone is permissible; see Comment, OralSearch Warrants:A New Standardof WarrantAvailability,21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 691 (1973-74); the extent to
which the record may diverge from a verbatim account; the degree to which a magistrate may be
conclusory in transcribing his account of what transpired in his office; and the permissibility of
eliciting testimony at the suppression hearing which tends to explore rather than supplement the
record. See People v. Christian, 27 Cal. App. 3d 554, 103 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1972).
107 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1927).

